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Abstract
ESSAYS ON EVIDENCES AND EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL
MOVEMENTS OF FACTORS
Sudeshna Pal
This dissertation presents three essays on the evidence and effects of international mobility
of capital and labor. Essay 1 explores the behavior of this coefficient in OECD countries
over a thirty year period. The second and third essays focus on international movements of
labor measured by immigration and outsourcing. The second essay theoretically examines
the impact of low skill outsourcing on domestic tax rates, namely labor tax and profit tax.
The third essay empirically shows the impact of low skilled immigration and outsourcing on
labor tax rates in OECD countries. What follows is a summary of the essays.
The first essay, “ Reassessing International Capital Mobility: The Feldstein-Horioka
Puzzle Disappears” examines how capital mobility changed over the years, especially during
the 1990s often termed as the era of globalization. Feldstein - Horioka type regressions
using pooled annual data for OECD countries show that savings-investment correlations
fall continuously throughout the 1990s implying increasing capital mobility. This is in sharp
contrast to the fairly stable behavior of the coefficient till late 1980s. Evidences show that the
phenomenon is indeed global and not country specific. Current account data also confirms
increased capital mobility. Developing countries too become financially integrated during
the 1990s, but they had an earlier start than OECD nations.
The second essay, “Outsourcing and Domestic Tax Policy”, is a theoretical depiction
of the impact of foreign outsourcing on domestic tax rates. The model includes two types
of workers, namely managers or high skilled workers who also own the firms and workers
who are low skilled and are hired by the managers. An individual can choose to become
either of the two given his innate ability and the cost of acquiring skills. In addition, we
introduce outsourcing as a factor in a firm’s decision making. The firms or managers can
hire native workers and outsource jobs abroad. The government taxes both labor income
and profit income and provides transfers. The tax rates are determined through a process
of voting in which the median voter plays a pivotal role. Our model shows that if the
domestic firms increase foreign outsourcing, labor tax rates decline and profit tax rates
increase unambiguously in the home country.
The third essay, “Immigration, Outsourcing and Tax Policy: Evidence from OECD Coun-
tries” studies effects of immigration and outsourcing on domestic labor tax rates. Immigra-
tion and outsourcing are typically portrayed as substitutes in production and in terms of
their effects on the domestic economy. A political economy analysis shows that immigra-
tion and outsourcing may actually have very different impact on the domestic economy, so
that they may not be viewed as “substitutes” anymore. A study on 15 OECD countries
finds that while low skilled immigration increases tax burden on domestic labor, low skilled
outsourcing may actually reduce it. Low skilled immigration may impose additional fiscal
burden and thus lead to higher tax rates on labor. Outsourcing of low skilled jobs, on the
other hand, does not make any claims on government transfers and therefore, may result in
lower domestic labor tax rates.
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International integration of factor markets ensures efficient allocation of resources on a global
level. The inherent trade off between efficiency and equity most naturally becomes an is-
sue in studying globalization of factor markets. The 1990s, typically viewed as the era of
globalization was marked by capital market deregulations in developed economies. Capital
moved out from these economies to other parts of the world both in the form of FDI and
outsourcing. It is the latter form of capital movement that we focus on. The increased global
mobility of the relatively mobile capital in turn affected the market for relatively immobile
factors, namely, unskilled labor. The purpose of this study is first, to examine the degree
of globalization in international capital markets and then focus on public finance effects of
outsourcing on domestic unskilled labor, and also compare the results with international
immigration effects.
The analysis thus begins with an open economy macroeconomics approach towards as-
sessing the degree of international capital mobility. The empirical results show phenomenal
increase in capital mobility in the past few decades. The study then adopts a microeconomic
approach to analyze the impact of outsourcing on labor income tax. A political equilibrium
model shows that outsourcing increases the burden of income tax on domestic unskilled
labor. The theory thus established will then be verified empirically. The entire study fo-
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cuses on OECD countries as these are capital abundant economies and have opened up their
financial markets in the era of globalization.
The outcomes of this analysis, apart from providing new insights about international fac-
tor market integration, also contradicts some existing theories and evidences in international
trade and finance. The findings are presented in the form of three essays.
Chapter 2, titled, “Reassessing International Capital Mobility: The Feldstein-Horioka
Puzzle Disappears”, examines the degree of capital mobility in OECD countries. Saving-
investment correlation coefficient acts as an indicator of international capital mobility. Pooled
cross-section time-series regressions show that capital in OECD countries changed from be-
ing almost perfectly immobile between the seventies and early nineties to nearly perfectly
mobile during the late nineties. These findings also show that the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle
that capital was almost perfectly immobile across OECD countries has disappeared in the
late nineties.
In a study by Feldstein and Horioka (date), they show that violating the theoretical
foundations of intertemporal current account models, a sample of 16 OECD countries show
that capital was almost perfectly immobile during 1960-1974. They measure capital mobility
as the correlation coefficient between long term averages of domestic savings (S) and invest-
ment (I). Under perfect capital mobility this correlation coefficient should be equal to zero.
They, however, find that the coefficient is close to one which means there is no international
mobility of capital.
We estimate the Feldstein-Horioka regression for the period 1970-2003 for 29 OECD
countries. The regression equation has the share of investment in GDP as the dependent
variable and the share of savings in GDP as the explanatory variable. Our model uses annual
data on savings and investment, following Sinn (1991) instead of long term averages. Annual
data takes into account short-term movements of capital as much as it exposes the outcomes
to short-term output fluctuations. Infact, a common criticism against the Feldstein-Horioka
result is that saving and investment both are procyclical and hence appear to be correlated.
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The inclusion of an international business cycle term in our model accommodates for short-
term output fluctuations.
The value of the S-I correlation coefficient remain close to one for 1970s, 1980s. The
coefficient starts to decline during the nineties and shows a sharp fall during the late nineties
during which it approaches zero. Country by country tests prove the robustness of our results.
The S-I correlation coefficient behaves in the same fashion for subsamples formed by leaving
one country out at a time. This also proves that no one country is the driving force of our
result and capital is indeed becoming almost perfectly mobile internationally.
Chapter 3, titled “Outsourcing and Domestic Tax Policy”, provides a theoretical model
explaining the effect of outsourcing on domestic labor and profit tax rates. The model rests
on the median voter theory of taxation. In an economy consisting of two types of labor,
namely managers or the high skilled and workers or the low skilled, an increase in foreign
outsourcing of low skill jobs unambiguously drives down labor tax rates while causing profit
taxes to rise in the domestic economy.
Chapter 4, namely, “Immigration, Outsourcing and Tax Policy:Evidence from OECD
Countries” looks at the impact of outsourcing on labor income tax rate as opposed to that
of immigration in OECD countries. Both immigration and outsourcing implies sharing the
production process between domestic and foreign labor. The substitution of domestic un-
skilled labor by cheap foreign labor, whether in the form of hiring immigrants or outsourcing,
is expected to yield similar labor market outcomes. Our study, however, shows that more
indirect impact in terms of public finance implications are quite the opposite for the two.
As the global boundaries started to loosen over more than a decade now, factor mobility
also got redefined. This is especially true for economically developed countries. Not only
these countries attract cheap labor from the developing world, but they also send out part or
whole of their own jobs to the labor abundant low income countries. Soon enough the cost
saving strategies began to boomerang and strong feelings of insecurity spread among the
domestic labor force of the advanced part of the world. The goal of this paper is precisely
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to examine from a political economy point of view the effects of international migration
and outsourcing on public finance concerns by focusing on the resulting impact of these two
alternatives on domestic labor taxes.
When a country’s market opens up to cheap foreign labor force, either by immigration
or by outsourcing, the domestic labor market is bound to get affected. Is their a difference
as far as their impact on the domestic labor market is concerned? We claim that different
levels of immigration and outsourcing affect domestic economic agents in conflicting ways.
Hence, under majority voting, we expect different equilibrium levels of domestic labor tax
rates chosen in each case. Evidences from OECD countries show that while low skilled
immigration puts additional burden on domestic workers in the form of higher taxes, low
skilled outsourcing actually reduces it. The finding also defies popular belief that immigration
and outsourcing are two sides of the same coin.
The main conclusion of this study is that countries that opt for higher immigration than
outsourcing will also end up with higher labor tax rates. The evidences also provide support
for the theory that increase in low skilled outsourcing raises productivity of domestic low
skilled workers. As these workers move up the income scale, they vote for lower taxes.








Open economy macroeconomic policies rely heavily on inter-temporal models of current ac-
count. Current account balance in turn is a reflection of dynamic investment and savings
behavior. A shortage or surplus in the domestic financial market is accommodated by in-
ternational capital flows. The degree of international mobility of capital, therefore, has
important macroeconomic implications. The ease with which an economy can borrow funds
from the international capital market reflects its ability to cope with external shocks as well
as internal impediments to private investment opportunities. Also, the degree of capital
mobility acts as a measure of global financial integration.
Feldstein and Horioka (1980), tested the degree of international mobility of capital with
16 OECD countries for the period 1960-1974. They define the degree of capital mobility in
terms of correlation between domestic investment and saving. The correlation coefficients
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for their sample were positive and close to one for almost every year. The implication was
that capital was almost perfectly immobile among developed countries.
Research on the dynamics of international capital mobility has continued ever since. In a
recent working paper, Feldstein(2005) mentions of his ongoing research on saving-investment
correlations. The correlation declines significantly after 1995 for the OECD countries when he
puts equal weights to the countries. He uses long term average data for his study. However,
in his sample of 30 OECD countries the lowest value attained by the saving-investment
correlation coefficient is 0.30 in 2001, whereas our analysis estimates this value to be almost
equal to zero suggesting near perfect mobility of capital. A recent study by Ball (2006)
studies the US economy and shows that though there have been no noticeable change in
US trade flows, the degree of financial openness of the economy has gone up remarkably
in recent years. These coupled with the KOF Index of Globalization (2007), that shows a
sharp increase in economic globalization across the world and particularly so for the OECD
countries during the late nineties forms the motivation behind our study of the evolving
international financial market integration. In our attempt to do so we are able to establish
that the degree of financial market globalization becomes significantly high in the past few
years and the famous FH puzzle is on the verge of its disappearance. To the best of our
knowledge no other research has considered looking at the dynamics of capital mobility in
OECD countries during recent years using annual data and the methods used in this paper.
The goal of this study, as said before, is to examine how capital mobility evolved over
time and whether it has really attained the perfection it possesses in macroeconomic theories.
This analysis also aims to quantify the degree of international capital mobility. Our model
uses Feldstein-Horioka type regressions using annual data and generates the dynamics and
measurements of international capital mobility in 29 OECD countries for the period 1970-
2003. Annual data on savings and investment shares of GDP, following Sinn (1991), apart
from providing a generous dataset, yield exact year to year estimates of saving-investment
correlations and do not require the intertemporal budget constraint. However, the data
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is likely to contain business cycle effects. Sachs et al. (1981) use a business cycle proxy
constructed with detrended GDP. We use the same proxy to control for global business cycle
effects. Eventually this study employs a pooled model with time dummies that yield exact
year to year dynamics of how this coefficient behaves over time and across countries.
Several sensitivity analyses re-confirm the findings of the pooled regressions. Keeping in
mind the spree of liberalization and integration with the EU that were in operation during
the late nineties, it is reasonable to believe that capital mobility was more concentrated than
global. Countries like Greece and Portugal, for instance were integrated to the EU during
the nineties, an event followed by huge inflow and outflow of capital in these economies.
Also the US economy has experienced phenomenal increase in financial openness since 1990.
Moreover, KOF globalization indices 2007, reveal that the 15 most globalization nations are
members of the OECD countries. We therefore account for the possible dominant effect of
any single country in driving the results of the main regression by excluding a particular
country from the dataset and re-estimating the model. This is done for each country in the
whole sample.
An alternative estimation method, in particular, Sachs et al.’s (1981) current account
approach is used to further reinforce the findings of our main regression. The alternative
model, henceforth referred to as “the current account model”, uses pooled data on share
of current account surplus in GDP, as the dependent variable and share of investment in
GDP as the explanatory variable. Investment turns out to be a significant determinant of
and almost perfectly inversely related with current account balance. This re-confirms the
dynamics of capital mobility found in the first model.
While the case for a near perfect capital mobility is made for the developed countries,
the developing countries which are less favorable to a strong capital market are also tested
for the degree of global financial integration. FH regression analysis for developing countries
show that capital mobility in these countries in recent years is as high as the developed
nations. However, the process of getting integrated to the global financial market started
7
much earlier in the developing countries and has been consistently and gradually gaining
strength since then.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief account of past and present
research on the issue. Section 3 presents the first regression with investment share in GDP
as the dependent variable and savings share of GDP as the explanatory variable as well as
the sensitivity tests. Section 4 shows the current account approach to measuring capital
mobility. Section 5 analyses the case of developing countries. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
Feldstein and Horioka (1980) present an empirical critique of the perfect capital mobility
assumption used in international macro theory. As already mentioned, their study reveals
that capital was in fact immobile internationally. The near perfect correlation between
domestic investment and saving ruled out the possibility of free inflow or outflow of capital
in the OECD countries.
The initial finding by Feldstein and Horioka was followed by further studies on this
issue. Explanations attempting to resolve the observed puzzle initially involved defining and
measuring capital mobility using alternative approaches. Coakley et al. (1998) present two
methods to measure capital mobility.
The first is the FH quantity approach in which they adopt the partial equilibrium frame-
work used by Feldstein (1983) in order to analyze the identification problem. In this model
national saving, investment and balance of payments are expressed as functions of the real
interest rate and random shocks. The testing of FH coefficient in this model amounts to
testing saving-investment correlation as well as real interest rate parity. Frankel (1991) finds
that real interest rate parity does not hold for major industrialized countries and that, ac-
cording to him, explains the FH coefficient. The failure of the real exchange rate parity,
on the other hand could be explained by the existence of volatility of currency premium
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that results from instability of real and nominal exchange rates as claimed by Frankel(1991,
1992). Frankel also provides two definitions of perfect capital mobility other than the real
exchange rate parity. These are covered interest parity and uncovered interest parity. The
second approach is that of consumption smoothing.
As Coakley et al. (1998) point out, the original responses to the FH puzzle were in terms
of econometric errors as the main factors guiding their result. These included identification
problem, misspecification, simultaneity bias, permanent and transitory effects, sample sensi-
tivity and non stationarity. They find the FH regression results to be robust in general and
particularly so for cross section analysis. Obstfeld (1986), Baxter and Crucini (1993.) argue
that OECD saving and investment data do not reflect the true values. The difference arises
when the domestic firms are mostly owned by foreigners and that tends to increase the corre-
lation coefficient between saving and investment. Other cross sectional studies like Feldstein
and Bacchetta (1991) use 23 OECD countries, and also extend the number of years like in
Murphy (1984), Penati and Dooley (1984), Obstfeld (1986), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995),
Coakley et al. (1994). The original FH results remain fairly undisputed in all these studies.
Some variation in studies, however, like Sinn (1992), that use less than decade averages
yield coefficients less than 0.7. Another very common problem pointed out was that of
saving being endogenous and the resulting simultaneity bias in the correlation coefficient.
FH controlled for this problem by following an instrumental variable approach. It did not
alter FH’s original finding. The endogeneity issue was also put forward in the form of the
’policy reaction’ argument, which is one of the most popular critiques against the FH puzzle.
This argument is based on the premise that government policies designed to eliminate trade
imbalances result in saving investment correlation. Taking into account the endogenous
nature of savings, Sachs (1981, 1983) regresses current account against investment to test for
a null hypothesis of unit coefficient. Frankel (1991) claims that factors producing endogeneity
in savings should do the same to investment. The conclusion was that investment, national
saving, and current account are all endogenous, and so the ordinary least square approach
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to the problem was put into question.
Panel data analyses of the FH puzzle by Feldstein (1983), Coakley et al (1994, 1996a,
1996) do not yield results significantly different from the original study. There are also a
number of studies on the sample sensitivity of the regression. Murphy (1984) segregates his
data on 17 OECD countries into two groups consisting of ten large and seven small countries
and finds the coefficient to be much smaller (0.59) for small countries and much larger (0.98)
for the large country group. This, he argues, is consistent with country size effect when
there is capital mobility. Harberger (1980) argues that a large country is more diversified
than a small country and so does not need to borrow funds from the global market. The
FH coefficient thus reflects large country bias rather than capital immobility. Feldstein and
Bacchetta (1991) re-examine the hypothesis of zero correlation coefficient by distinguishing
between EU countries and non-EU countries. They find that using net amounts the value of
the coefficient declined gradually for the EU countries till 1980 after which the decline was
sharp. On the other hand the coefficient for non-EU countries declined gradually throughout.
The gross measures, however, produced opposite outcomes. They concluded that capital is
more mobile among EU countries.
Also studies on developing countries by Dooley et al. (1987) and Mamingi (1994) show
that the saving investment coefficient is much weaker for these countries. The common
argument for this is that developing countries are small open economies and thus have the
country size effect. More recent studies by Miller (1988), Gundlach and Sinn (1992), Ghosh
(1995), Coakley et al (1996a, 1996b) , Coakley and Kulasi (1997a) focus on stationarity
issues. Their general conclusion is that for both developing and OECD countries,the current
account is unit root stationary or saving and investment are cointegrated. In a very recent
study by Mark et al. (2004), they employ an alternative method called the dynamic seemingly
unrelated cointegrating regression or DSUR in analyzing the puzzle. They, too, find the long
run slope coefficients in the saving investment relation to be close to one for most countries.
The existing literature examines the FH puzzle from various perspectives. Most of the
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studies focus on empirical variations of the original finding. The main contribution of this
paper is that it uses annual data on saving and investment to show that FH results weaken
considerably towards the late 1990s and early 2000 and addresses some of the econometric
issues (such as business cycle and sample sensitivity effects on estimates).
3 Saving-Investment Correlations
The first approach towards examining the degree of capital mobility in OECD countries
uses pooled annual data on savings and investment shares of GDP from 29 OECD countries
for the period 1970-2003. While the use of annual data ensures that the model considers
short-term inflow and outflow of capital, it also exposes the estimates to the influences of
short term output fluctuations. A proxy for business cycles is constructed following Sachs
(1981). The proxy is essentially a measure of detrended GDP over the sample period for all
OECD countries.1
We estimate the following regression:






βt(S/Y )it · dt + εit (2.1)
where, (I/Y )it = gross domestic investment as a share of GDP for country ‘i’ at time ‘t’
(S/Y )it = gross domestic savings as a share of GDP for country ‘i’ at time ‘t’
gdpgit = detrended GDP at constant 2000 prices for every country i for each year t
dt = time dummy for year ‘t’
The sample period covers the years 1970-2003 and 29 OECD countries, the model thus yields
thirty-four estimates of the saving-investment correlation coefficient for the OECD countries.
World Development Indicators 2005 provides data on share of gross domestic savings and
1Sachs et al. (1981) use GNP gap. This paper uses GDP gap instead. To construct the business cycle
proxy variable the regression GDPit = ai + bi · year+ eit for country “i” and year “t”, is estimated and the
residuals are used in regression (2.1) as gdpg.
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investment.2
Table 2.1 presents the results of regression (2.1). The “β-coefficient” is the correlation
between shares of domestic investment and savings in GDP. It is also referred to as the
“savings retention coefficient”, in Feldstein (2005). In the event of perfect capital mobility
this coefficient should be equal to zero. The early seventies, as Table 2.1 shows, exhibit
a very strong positive correlation between gross domestic investment and gross domestic
savings as shares of GDP, with a maximum of 0.87 in 1973. This confirms the original
findings by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). The retention coefficients in our regression remain
positive and strong post 1970 but are now of smaller magnitudes. Throughout the 80’s, the
coefficients range between 0.37 in 1983 and 0.68 in 1986. This is followed by a consistent
decline in the value of the “β-coefficient” with mild fluctuations. The decline sharpens
towards the end of the 90’s when there is a steep fall in the value of the retention coefficient
going over to the next century. The coefficient drops consistently from a 0.54 in 1995, 0.50
in 1996 to as low as 0.23 in 1998 going down further to 0.17 in 1999 and then as low as 0.08
in 2000. The value of the retention coefficient remains close to zero till the end of the sample
period. Figure 2.2.1 depicts the movement of the retention coefficient over the entire sample
period.
The estimated intercept in regression (2.1) measures “gross domestic investment share
in GDP” in the absence of “gross domestic savings”. Figure 2.2 shows the behavior of the
intercept term over the sample period. In the absence of any domestic savings, the share
of investment in GDP is quite unstable. The pre-1990’s is characterized by intermittent
rise and fall in domestic investment (when share of savings is zero). During the 1990’s the
magnitudes of the intercept increase significantly. This coincides with the period which also
shows a rapidly weakening saving-investment correlation. Domestic investment share reaches
its peak in 1998 at 21% of GDP when domestic saving is absent.
2A description of the data set is provided in the Appendix A
12
3.1 Sample Sensitivity and Robustness Tests
The literature shows that sample sensitivity inter alia is an important issue in the context
of the existence of the puzzle. Sample sensitivity tests of the above model shows that the
results suggesting the disappearance of the puzzle are robust. A country by country test, as
mentioned earlier in the paper, singles out any dominant effect that a country might have
had on the results. A unique country is excluded at a time from the sample and regression
(2.1) is estimated over and over again for each of these subsamples. The estimates in each
subsample remain consistent with negligible differences with the outcomes of regression (2.1)
with all OECD countries. Table 2.2 presents a comparison between the original 29 country
regression and the subsample regressions, it shows the reported means and standard errors
of the subsamples.
The analysis also examines but does not report, for each year, the subsample with the
maximum difference with the full sample estimates. This allows one to see whether any
particular country is significantly different from the rest and if that affects our initial finding.
No one country proves to be particularly the driving force, however, Korea maintains the
maximum departure during most of the 1990s and 2000. The estimates excluding Korea are
on an average 15% less than the full sample estimates between 1990-2003. The implication
is that Korea is not at par with the other OECD countries as far as financial globalization
is concerned. Why is it so can be a subject of future research.3
White’s heteroscedasticity tests reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity of the error
term that is correctd by three staged least squares method. Table 2.4 presents the results of
the 3SLS procedure for the FH regression.
3The US, Greece and Portugal were expected to have some signifcant impact. The US economy, given
its lion’s share in the global financial market could have been crucial in the observed increase in financial
integration. In a recent article Feldstein (2006) discusses how household savings in the US are really sliding
down and so the country is becoming more and more dependent on the international capital market for
investment funds. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) examine the degree of financial integration in the Euro
area with special attention to the Greek and Portuguese economies. They show that both Greece and
Portugal were integrated to the global financial market during the 1990s. These countries. however, have
marginal impact on our results.
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4 Current Account and Capital Mobility
When current account balance responds significantly and inversely to changes in domestic
investment capital is mobile internationally. For instance, if an increase in domestic invest-
ment is associated with an exact decrease in current account surplus it means that capital
is moving in absolutely freely, the converse is true for a decrease in domestic investment.
Thus, an alternative way to test for the perfect mobility of global capital is to look at the
correlation between investment and current account balance, as used by Sachs et al. (1981).
They explain the current account using investment and GNP gap. In an individual coun-
try wise analysis, they show that for developed countries there exists a negative correlation
between investment and current account surplus, and that the coefficient is close to one for
most countries. This suggests that current account deficits and surpluses are corrected by
international capital movements.
The data used in our current account model comprises of shares of current account surplus
and investment in GDP for all OECD countries leaving Czech Republic and Slovak Republic
due to unavailabilty of data. We therefore estimate the following model:






βt(I/Y )it · dt + εit (2.2)
where, CAit = current account balance as a share of GDP for country i at time t
(I/Y )it = gross domestic investment as a share of GDP for country i at time t
gdpgit = detrended GDP at constant 2000 prices for every country i for each year t
dt = time dummy for year t
Table 2.3 presents the results of regression (2.2). The period during which S-I corre-
lation coefficient decreases in value and approaches zero in regression (2.1), the current
account-investment coefficient shows the exact opposite behavior. Not only is the correlation-
coefficient between current account balance and investment negative and approaches negative
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one over this period, also investment is found to be a significant determinant of current ac-
count balance as well. The coefficient changes from -0.05 in 1995 to -0.24 in 1997 to -0.49
in 1999 and -0.68 in 2000. Thus investment becomes increasingly important in determin-
ing current account balance. A current account deficit is accompanied by inflow of foreign
capital. This provides further evidence in support of the increasing global capital mobility
towards the end of the last century and beginning of the present.
Conventional theory suggests that an increase in GDP should lead to greater import de-
mand which in turn magnifies trade deficit. Accordingly, the coefficient of gdpg in regression
(2.2) should be negative. Our results show that the gdpg coefficient is -9.14, which is both
negative and significant.
Figure 2.3 presents the S-I correlation coefficient as well as the current account-investment
correlation coefficient for all OECD members. It is clear that the period over which the S-I
coefficient declines sharply and almost approaches zero, the CA-I coefficient declines too and
approaches negative one.
Table 2.4 presents the results of the 3SLS procedure for regression (2.2) along with the
3SLS results for regression (2.1).
5 Developing Countries
The analysis so far implies that international financial integration is indeed strengthened
towards the late 1990s as far as developed countries are concerned. However, in order to
ascribe a global status to this observed phenomenon it is necessary to study the developing
countries. Did developing countries also become financially integrated during this time?
FH regressions are estimated with 61 developing countries for every year between 1970
and 2003. Table 2.5 presents the regression results for developing countries. As the table
depicts and as earlier research shows, developing countries started off with a much lower
savings retention coefficient than the developed countries. The coefficient for developing
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countries continue to decline thereafter bearing evidence to huge inflow of foreign capital in
these countries, especially during 1973-81.
The evidence on developing countries suggests that these countries have been financially
more open all along the sample period. The decrease in the magnitude of the coefficient has
started much earlier and has been more gradual and consistent for the developing countries
as compared to the OECD countries. Figure 2.4 shows a graphical representation of this
phenomenon. The graph shows that after the sharp fall in the value of the coefficient for the
OECD countries the two sets of countries appear to move towards convergence. Financial
globalization hence appears to be truly global. At the same time it also indicates that major
changes post 1995 have remained somewhat confined to the developed nations. Developing
countries start off with a higher degree of financial integration but have made a gradual
progress towards improving it and finally converging with the rich nations. Developed coun-
tries, on the other hand, seem to have started off a bit late but proceeded with remarkable
pace towards international integration of capital markets.
6 Conclusion
The Feldstein-Horioka puzzle has mystified international macroeconomics for over a decade.
The analysis with recent data implies that the puzzle is on the verge of disappearance.
Sample sensitivity tests for individual country effects verify whether the apparent increase
in global capital mobility is truly so. The purpose of this study is to provide evidences
in support of the phenomenal growth in financial globalization. Accounting for the factors
responsible for this is something beyond the scope of this paper but will certainly be an issue
for future research.
Our plans for further research in this area aim at but are not confined to identifying
various components of world capital that have been globalized. Distinguishing between
FDI and portfolio investment as well as foreign aid in case of developing countries has the
16
potential of generating useful and interesting results in the context of financial integration.
Examination and analysis of government policy and institutional issues become imperative
in this regard.
17
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Table 2.1: Saving Investment Correlation Coefficients for 29 OECD Countries
Dependent Variable:Investment
Year Intercept S.E. β̂ S.E. Year Intercept S.E. β̂ S.E.
1970 6.3418 3.0826 0.8477 0.1148 1988 3.0355 4.6743 0.5856 0.1415
1971 0.7692 4.1417 0.8200 0.1063 1989 2.5705 4.6607 0.6245 0.1400
1972 -0.8941 4.3865 0.8196 0.1176 1990 5.4735 4.3965 0.5006 0.1255
1973 -2.1273 4.4999 0.8718 0.1196 1991 2.6268 4.2135 0.6072 0.1220
1974 6.4801 4.1771 0.6477 0.1083 1992 2.4893 4.1755 0.5969 0.1255
1975 0.9906 4.1832 0.8199 0.1181 1993 5.9429 4.0629 0.4191 0.1191
1976 2.1997 4.5816 0.7371 0.1393 1994 4.7891 4.3420 0.4637 0.1327
1977 3.3735 4.7164 0.6776 0.1467 1995 3.2636 4.4407 0.5399 0.1321
1978 -0.7805 4.7517 0.8038 0.1484 1996 4.6709 4.3972 0.5049 0.1307
1979 4.5738 4.6847 0.6043 0.1453 1997 7.2484 4.3723 0.4000 0.1263
1980 7.5505 4.3816 0.4952 0.1317 1998 11.5984 4.3225 0.2265 0.1232
1981 8.2452 4.3035 0.4285 0.1303 1999 12.5448 4.2385 0.1732 0.1195
1982 6.5871 4.5334 0.4794 0.1447 2000 14.9018 4.0651 0.0829 0.1063
1983 7.9166 4.4607 0.3679 0.1401 2001 13.0160 4.1323 0.1225 0.1122
1984 6.8747 4.4375 0.4094 0.1344 2002 12.8096 4.1064 0.1019 0.1136
1985 3.6105 4.5017 0.5506 0.1385 2003 8.2932 4.7802 0.3230 0.1591
1986 0.4549 4.7693 0.6821 0.1536
1987 1.5273 4.6386 0.6419 0.1448 gdpg 16.2771 2.5931
The estimates Intercept and β̂ measure respectively the constant and the saving-investment correlation




t=1 βt(S/Y )it · dt + εit The variable gdpg
is a proxy accounting for short term business cycle effects.
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Table 2.2: Full Sample vs. Subsample Estimates
Year AllOECD SubMean SubSE Year AllOECD SubMean SubSE
1970 0.8477 0.8386 0.0236 1987 0.6419 0.6491 0.0262
1971 0.8197 0.8062 0.0219 1988 0.5856 0.5951 0.0225
1972 0.8195 0.8023 0.0129 1989 0.6245 0.6284 0.0245
1973 0.8718 0.8695 0.0183 1990 0.5006 0.5038 0.0332
1974 0.6477 0.6473 0.0268 1991 0.6072 0.6078 0.0377
1975 0.8199 0.8127 0.0302 1992 0.5969 0.5970 0.0330
1976 0.7372 0.7339 0.0348 1993 0.4192 0.4223 0.0357
1977 0.6776 0.6782 0.0330 1994 0.4637 0.4598 0.0406
1978 0.8038 0.8053 0.0402 1995 0.5399 0.5373 0.0465
1979 0.6043 0.6014 0.0536 1996 0.5049 0.5053 0.0503
1980 0.4952 0.5007 0.0340 1997 0.4000 0.3989 0.0395
1981 0.4285 0.4434 0.0362 1998 0.2265 0.2235 0.0177
1982 0.4794 0.4807 0.0260 1999 0.1732 0.1708 0.0264
1983 0.3679 0.3751 0.0283 2000 0.0829 0.0871 0.0269
1984 0.4094 0.4159 0.0227 2001 0.1225 0.1242 0.0288
1985 0.5506 0.5512 0.0252 2002 0.1019 0.1011 0.0323
1986 0.6821 0.6842 0.0204 2003 0.3231 0.3205 0.0497
Columns AllOECD show the estimates from the regression (I/Y )it = γ · gdpgit +
∑34
t=1 αtdt +∑34
t=1 βt(S/Y )it · dt + εit for all OECD countries. Columns SubMean present the mean of the subsample
estimates for each year. Each subsample has a unique country missing from the full sample of 29 OECD
countries. Columns SubSE show the standard errors of the subsamples for every year.
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Table 2.3: Current Account Approach to the FH puzzle
Dependent Variable: Current Account Balance
Year Intercept S.E. Invest S.E. Year Intercept S.E. Invest S.E.
1970 4.2567 8.0512 -0.1826 0.3276 1988 -10.3213 9.1810 0.2388 0.1831
1971 -1.4967 11.3440 -0.1079 0.3146 1989 -10.0062 9.1863 0.2056 0.1793
1972 -4.6723 11.7392 0.0432 0.3474 1990 -9.6469 9.0350 0.2007 0.1684
1973 -0.5632 12.8410 -0.1231 0.3871 1991 -7.7396 8.7550 0.1143 0.1511
1974 6.5991 10.0700 -0.5178 0.2311 1992 -9.2453 8.7134 0.1896 0.1555
1975 2.3842 9.0508 -0.3587 0.1647 1993 -8.3940 8.7148 0.1643 0.1610
1976 4.3055 9.4244 -0.4264 0.1865 1994 -3.2505 8.8532 -0.0658 0.1743
1977 3.5205 9.3758 -0.3786 0.1841 1995 -2.8898 8.8319 -0.0547 0.1666
1978 -2.7080 9.2699 -0.0949 0.1843 1996 0.8474 8.7745 -0.2365 0.1582
1979 0.2859 9.1798 -0.2402 0.1705 1997 1.2405 8.9813 -0.2365 0.1757
1980 -4.7139 9.1507 -0.0804 0.1677 1998 5.1804 9.6531 -0.4172 0.2321
1981 1.8354 8.9334 -0.3687 0.1562 1999 6.1695 9.6430 -0.4867 0.2309
1982 1.2976 8.8853 -0.3338 0.1561 2000 11.0290 9.4540 -0.6841 0.2112
1983 -2.5516 9.1945 -0.1250 0.1949 2001 8.5810 9.4215 -0.5779 0.2213
1984 -2.4077 9.3410 -0.1180 0.2050 2002 9.5135 9.5350 -0.6428 0.2386
1985 -4.5070 9.3662 -0.0291 0.2095 2003 8.0586 9.5724 -0.5672 0.2419
1986 -3.1324 9.1851 -0.0862 0.1937
1987 -9.196 9.2112 0.1954 0.1935 gdpg -9.1375 3.3810
The estimates Invest measure the coefficient of Investment in the regression CAit = γ ·gdpgit +
∑34
t=1 αtdt +∑34
t=1 βt(I/Y )it · dt + εit. The estimate gdpg measures the coefficient of the proxy for short term output
fluctuations in the same regression. It is estimated to be -9.14 (S.E. 3.38).
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Table 2.4: FH Approach vs. Current Account Approach
Dependent Variables: Investment and Current Account Balance
Year β̂FH S.E. β̂CA S.E. Year β̂FH S.E. β̂CA S.E.
1970 0.8477 0.1148 -0.1826 0.3276 1988 0.5856 0.1415 0.2388 0.1831
1971 0.8197 0.1063 -0.1079 0.3146 1989 0.6245 0.1400 0.2056 0.1793
1972 0.8195 0.1176 0.0432 0.3474 1990 0.5006 0.1255 0.2007 0.1684
1973 0.8718 0.1196 -0.1231 0.3871 1991 0.6072 0.1220 0.1143 0.1511
1974 0.6477 0.1083 -0.5179 0.2311 1992 0.5969 0.1255 0.1896 0.1555
1975 0.8199 0.1181 -0.3587 0.1647 1993 0.4192 0.1191 0.1644 0.1610
1976 0.737 0.1393 -0.4264 0.1865 1994 0.4637 0.1327 -0.0658 0.1743
1977 0.6776 0.1467 -0.3786 0.1841 1995 0.5399 0.1321 -0.0547 0.1666
1978 0.8038 0.1484 -0.0949 0.1843 1996 0.5049 0.1307 -0.2365 0.1582
1979 0.6043 0.1453 -0.2402 0.1705 1997 0.4000 0.1263 -0.2365 0.1757
1980 0.4952 0.1317 -0.0804 0.1677 1998 0.2265 0.1232 -0.4172 0.2321
1981 0.4285 0.1303 -0.3687 0.1562 1999 0.1732 0.1195 -0.4867 0.2309
1982 0.4794 0.1447 -0.3338 0.1561 2000 0.0829 0.1063 -0.6841 0.2112
1983 0.3679 0.1401 -0.1250 0.1949 2001 0.1225 0.1122 -0.5779 0.2213
1984 0.4094 0.1344 -0.1180 0.2050 2002 0.1019 0.1136 -0.6428 0.2386
1985 0.5506 0.1385 -0.0291 0.2095 2003 0.3231 0.1591 -0.5672 0.2419
1986 0.6821 0.1536 -0.0862 0.1937
1987 0.6419 0.1448 0.1954 0.1935 gdpg 16.2771 2.5931 -9.1375 3.3810
The estimates β̂FH measure the saving-investment correlation coefficient for all OECD countries from the




t=1 βt(S/Y )it · dt + εit. The estimates β̂CA measure
the coefficient of investment for all OECD countries in the 3SLS regression CAit = γ · gdpgit +
∑34
t=1 αtdt +∑34
t=1 βt(I/Y )it · dt + εit.
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Table 2.5: FH-Coefficient for Developing Countries
Dependent Variable: Investment
Year Intercept S.E. β̂developing S.E. Year Intercept S.E. β̂developing S.E.
1970 11.2140 1.5832 0.4375 0.0826 1988 8.7974 2.0523 0.0437 0.0640
1971 0.9109 2.2154 0.4476 0.0828 1989 9.5609 2.1103 -0.0369 0.0710
1972 0.7357 2.1845 0.4643 0.0779 1990 10.087 2.1511 -0.0557 0.0741
1973 2.2639 2.2094 0.3727 0.0732 1991 9.5202 2.1044 -0.0064 0.0720
1974 4.9909 2.0854 0.2930 0.0537 1992 8.8218 2.0996 0.0674 0.0766
1975 7.1984 2.0361 0.3124 0.0575 1993 8.7124 2.0703 0.1028 0.0744
1976 8.6301 2.0109 0.2039 0.0512 1994 9.0699 2.0523 0.0989 0.0659
1977 8.5035 2.0731 0.2311 0.0571 1995 9.7421 2.1486 0.0844 0.0743
1978 7.5011 2.1415 0.3448 0.0672 1996 9.8659 2.1568 0.0438 0.0730
1979 9.8674 2.0695 0.1386 0.0591 1997 8.1767 2.1748 0.1440 0.0763
1980 9.5216 2.0438 0.1593 0.0577 1998 8.9574 2.1962 0.1071 0.0818
1981 9.7138 2.0000 0.1939 0.0578 1999 8.5690 2.2314 0.0432 0.0852
1982 9.3869 1.9934 0.1718 0.0576 2000 8.7961 2.1872 0.0367 0.0741
1983 7.4210 1.9710 0.1595 0.0535 2001 7.5715 2.1878 0.1260 0.0755
1984 7.0184 1.9882 0.1095 0.0543 2002 7.1032 2.1442 0.1006 0.0743
1985 7.7470 2.0034 0.0876 0.0587 2003 8.6546 2.1603 0.0425 0.0735
1986 7.7110 2.0508 0.0781 0.0669
1987 7.9287 2.0669 0.0378 0.0692 gdpg -1.0355 1.1447
The estimates Intercept and β̂developing measure respectively the constant and the saving-investment corre-




t=1 βt(S/Y )it · dt + εit for developing
countries. The variable gdpg is a proxy for short term output fluctuations.
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Chapter 3
Outsourcing and Domestic Tax Policy
1 Introduction
The recent surge of job outsourcing from developed to developing countries has sparked off
active research in this area. The phenomenon of outsourcing is not a new development in
this era of globalization; it is its changing nature that has triggered much controversy in
recent economic literature. A popular area of discussion has been the negative impact of job
outsourcing on labor market in the source country.
Most of existing work in this area focus on wage and productivity effects of foreign
outsourcing. This paper aims at analyzing the effect of international outsourcing on labor
and profit income taxes in the home country. A political equilibrium model following Razin
et al. (2002), in which they have analyzed the effect of immigration on the burden of labor
income tax, reveals that an increase in low skilled foreign outsourcing reduces the burden of
labor tax rates in the domestic economy while increasing profit tax rates.
The model includes two types of workers, namely managers or high skilled workers who
also own the firms and workers who are low skilled and are hired by the managers. An
individual can choose to become either of the two given his innate ability and the cost of
acquiring skills. In addition, we also introduce outsourcing as a factor in a firm’s decision
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making. The firms or managers can hire native workers and outsource jobs abroad. The
government taxes both labor income and profit income and provides transfers. The tax rates
are determined through a process of voting in which the median voter plays a pivotal role.
Our model shows that if the domestic firms increase foreign outsourcing, labor tax rates
decline and profit tax rates increase unambiguously in the home country.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of related literature.
Section 3 presents a political equilibrium model to show the effect of outsourcing on labor and
profit income tax rates. Section 4 presents some concluding remarks and policy implications.
2 Related Literature
The model developed in this paper is related to Razin et al. (2002), Saint-Paul (1994), and
Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2007). We use the median voter model from Razin et al. (2002)
to determine optimal tax rates and then analyze the impact of those of foreign outsourcing.
While Razin et al. (2002) focuses on the the impact of immigration on the determination
of the domestic income tax rate under majority voting, we examine the effect of outsourc-
ing. We will later compare our results to those in Razin et al. (2002). The distinction
between two categories of labor, namely managers and workers is based on the literature on
occupational choice and globalization. Few studies such as Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2007),
Antrás et al. (2006), Kremer and Maskin (2003) analyze the effect of foreign outsourcing on
domestic wages in the presence of occupational choice. While all these studies implicitly or
explicitly use the manager-worker theory, our model most closely related to Eeckhout and
Jovanovic (2007). They claim that with increased outourcing of low skilled activities there is
a shift in ocupational choice in the outsourcing countries where the labor force icnreasingly
choose to become managers and hence move up the income scale. We extend their study by
incorporating both labor and profit taxes into the model. Our finding that an increase in
outsourcing induces the median voter to vote for lower labor taxes supports their theory that
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exporting low skilled tasks to labor abundant low income countries raises the proportion of
managers in the domestic labor market and hence the real income. As a result they vote for
lower labor taxes. Profit taxes, on the other hand, increase, creating incentives for a part of
the labor force to become workers.
There are several other studies that relate outsourcing with relative wages of skilled and
unskilled workers in the domestic economy. The popular view is that increase in outsourcing
increases the relative wages of the skilled labor force.
International outsourcing leads to an outward shift in the relative demand curve for
labor, which in turn affects the relative wage. Feenstra and Hanson (1996) consider two
countries, skill-abundant-North and non-skill-abundant-South differing in wages. If North
manufactures intermediate inputs at a lower cost in South using unskilled labor, North would
then specialize in skilled goods. This would increase the demand for skilled labor in North
and raise the relative wage of skilled labor. Anderton and Brenton (1997) study the data
on UK’s manufacturing sector and measure outsourcing as the volume of imports from low
wage economies. They estimate that ‘low wage imports’ accounted for 40 percent of income
increase of high skilled workers in UK during the period 1970-83. They also find that the
imports accounted for one-third of the increase in employment of skilled labor. Head and
Ries (2000) study the Japanese economy and find a very strong positive correlation between
the change in a firm’s skilled wage share and the change in the share of low wage foreign
employment of the same firm. Over the last two decades Hong Kong has been sharing its
production process with China. Hsieh and Woo (1999) find a positive correlation between
Hong Kong’s outsourcing and its demand for skilled labor between 1981 and 1996. They
also find that during the same period there was strong direct relationship between imports
from China and the share of skilled wages in Hong Kong, further supporting the theory.
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3 The Model
Consider an economy populated by individuals characterized by their innate ability e: a
lower level of e indicates a lower cost of acquiring education. e follows a uniform distribution
on the interval [0, 1]. Individuals are endowed with one unit of labor time and decide whether
to invest in education or not. Those that receive education become managers, while those
that do not invest in education become unskilled workers.1
3.1 Firm’s Problem and Occupational Choice
Each firm produces output q with the input of a manager and a set of workers. The pro-
duction function is given by q = F (H), where H is the total number of workers employed
by the firm, F ′ > 0 and F ′′ < 0.2 A manager pays a wage w per unit of labor hired. The
manager owns the firm and receives the firm’s profits.3
Additionally, the country has access to the international labor market. Specifically,
suppose that each domestic firm has access to units of labor at wage , both taken as
exogenously given. is in this case a predetermined policy variable.
Individuals pay taxes: workers pay a labor income tax, with tax rate t, and managers pay
a tax on the income they receive, with tax rate τ . The latter is essentially a profit tax. The
cost of acquiring skills is given by γe, where γ > 0. Education costs are not tax deductible.
Total taxes collected by the government, denoted with a T , are uniformly distributed back
to the population.4
On one hand, an individual with innate ability e that invests in education and becomes
1To simplify the analysis, we assume that managers and unskilled workers are ex-post identical.
2It could also be assumed that the production function depends on the manager skill level, i.e., q =
(1− e)F (H).
3In Razin et al. (2002), the production function is assumed to exhibit CRS and factors of production
are perfectly substitutable. Factor prices are also given. Specifically, the production function is defined as
F (L,K) = wL+(1+r)K, where w is the wage rate and (1+r) is the gross rental price of capital. Moreover,
the tax rate on labor capital income is assumed to be the same.
4Since the total population has measure one, then each individual receives T .
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a manager would earn N(w, τ, )− γe+ T, where





{[F (H)− wh−](1− τ)}, (3.1)
and h is the number of domestic workers hired by the firm. The manager can employ domestic
labor or foreign labor to satisfy the total demand for labor of the firm, i.e., H = h+. As
long as in equilibrium w > (which is the case that we will consider in this paper), the FOC
F ′(H)− w = 0, (3.2)
implicitly defines the demand for labor for each manager, denoted by H(w).5 On the other
hand, an individual characterized by e would earn w(1− t) + T as an unskilled worker.
Assuming that individuals only care about the level of consumption or total disposable in-
come, then there exist a critical level of e, , for which individuals with e < become managers,
and e > remain unskilled. In other words, the set of managers is defined by
M(w, t, τ, ) ≡ {e ∈ [0, 1] : N(w, τ, )− γe > w(1− t)}, (3.3)
and the set of workers W is simply the complement of this set.
Once occupations are determined, it is possible to obtain the government’s tax revenue:
T (w, , t, τ, ) ≡ τπ(w, ) + (1−)tw. (3.4)




A market equilibrium is given by values {w,} such that
N(w, τ, )− γ + T (w, , t, τ, ) = w(1− t) + T (w, , t, τ, ), (3.5)
H(w) = (1−)+, (3.6)
as long as in equilibrium h(w) > 0 (or H(w)− > 0), so that w >. Equation (3.5) summarizes
the occupational decisions made by the population: it defines the value of e for which income
as a manager is equal to labor income. Equation (3.6) simply establishes that w is such that
labor demand is equal to labor supply. These two equations define (t, τ, ) and w(t, τ, ).
3.3 Comparative static results
We now examine how both and are affected by changes in t, τ, and . Differentiating the















∆ = −[h(1− τ) + (1− t)](h+ 1) + γ/F ′′ < 0, (3.8)
and h(w) = H(w)−. A higher level of t, for a given level of w, encourages individuals
to become managers, i.e., increases. As the number of managers gets larger, the relative
compensation of workers rises as well. Higher relative wages makes managerial work less
attractive, but still the value of is higher than the original one, with a lower labor tax rate.
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More outsourcing raises firms’ profits, making managerial work more attractive. As a result,
increases. Since the supply of domestic labor declines, and since we consider an equilibrium
where h > 0, then wages should increase, as shown in (3.10).
4 Tax rates
In this section, we derive the optimal tax rates for each group of individuals: managers and
workers. Individuals only care about the level of consumption or total disposable income.
Let c(e, t, τ, ) denote the consumption level of an individual with ability e. This function is
strictly decreasing in the innate ability parameter for managers and constant for unskilled
workers:
c(e, t, τ, ) =
 N(w, τ, )− γe+ T (w, , t, τ, ), if 0 ≤ e ≤ (t, τ, );w(1− t) + T (w, , t, τ, ), if (t, τ, ) < e ≤ 1. (3.11)
In what follows, we assume that tax rates are determined by majority voting. Our
objective consists on deriving the equilibrium level of each one of the tax rates for a given
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level of the other one. In this way, we avoid the problems created by multidimensional
voting, in this case, voting on two tax rates.
4.1 Labor tax rate
Since the tax rate t is determined by majority voting, we should determine whether the
median voter is the one deciding the outcome of the political process. Managers and workers
choose their preferred labor tax rate by maximizing (3.11) with respect to t, i.e.,
∂c(e, t, τ, )
∂t
≡ B(t, τ, ) = 0,
As individuals within each group (managers and workers) are ex-post identical, then they
will choose the same tax rate. Specifically, all e ∈ M choose the same tax rate, denoted
tm, and all e ∈ W choose tw.6 Under these conditions, the median voter becomes crucial in
determining the outcome of majority voting. Thus, the political equilibrium tax rate may be
obtained by maximizing the consumption of the median voter. The median voter, however,
can either belong to the group of managers or to the group of workers, so both alternatives
should be considered.
Given that the distribution of the ability parameter is uniform and that the population is
normalized to 1, the median voter is an individual with = 1/2. Thus, we can now substitute
e = 1/2 and derive the consumption of the median voter when the median voter is a manager,
∈M , and when the median voter is a worker , ∈ W . The objective functions are, respectively,
given by
c(, t, τ, ) =
 N(w, τ, )− γ/2 + T (w, , t, τ, ), if 0 ≤≤ (t, τ, );w(1− t) + T (w, , t, τ, ), if (t, τ, ) <≤ 1. (3.12)
6Note that the latter holds because ∂2c(e, t, τ, )/∂e∂t = 0.
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The first order-condition with respect to t
B(t, τ, ) =




= (1−)w + [t(1−)− τh]∂w
∂t
+ (τπ − tw) ∂
∂t
, (3.14)
implicitly defines the tax rate t as a function of τ,, or t(τ, ; e), for e ∈ {M,W}. The second-
order condition for a maximum is Bt < 0.






From the second order condition, Bt < 0. This means that the sign of ∂t/∂ is determined by
the sign of B. In what follows, we consider a numerical example to study the sign of (3.15).
Numerical example
In order to obtain further results, we construct a numerical example. We assume that
F (H) = Hα. In this case, the demand for labor for each firm or manager is H = (α/w)1/1−α.
We use the following parameter values: α = 0.80, γ = 0.20, and = 0.20.
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show the results of the numerical example. Each table presents the
values of the endogenous variables for different levels of outsourcing, represented by . The
results reported in Table 3.1 correspond to the workers’ preferred labor tax rate, and Table
3.2 shows the labor tax rate rate chosen by managers. It is clear from both tables that as the
amount of outsourced labor rises, the tax rate decided by majority voting unambiguously
goes down when both ∈ M and ∈ W . The difference between tw and tm is given precisely
by their levels, i.e., tw < tm for all .
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At higher values of , profits go up, so the relative supply of managers increases as well.
Hence, the equilibrium level of w becomes higher. Since profits go up, workers can choose a
lower labor tax rate, which raises their net wage w(1 − t), while still observing an increase
in total taxes T . The latter occurs because the higher level of profit taxes more than
compensates the decline in tww(1−). For managers, the preferred labor tax is considerably
higher. Even though net profits are smaller in this case relative to the case where workers
determine the tax rate, total taxes substantially increase, making managers better off. As a
result, managers are able in this way to increase their disposable income by redistributing
income from workers.
The paper by Razin et al. (2002) focuses on the impact of immigration. In a similar
setup, they show that immigration may have an ambiguous effect on domestic income tax
rates. They claim that, in fact, it is likely to expect lower tax rates and, hence, a lower
amount of redistribution, in the presence of low-skill immigration. The idea is that low-skill
immigrants may end up receiving a disproportionate amount of the transfers targeted to low
income groups. Thus, low-skill natives may find it desirable to vote for lower income taxes
along with high-skill individuals. As they state in their paper, this result contrasts with
the “conventional wisdom”; it is generally claimed that the presence of low-skill immigrants
leads to a increase in the domestic tax burden because both the low-skill natives and low-skill
immigrants join forces to vote for higher levels of taxes and redistribution. Our results, on
the other hand, show that outsourcing unambiguously decreases the political equilibrium
labor tax rate, indicating that once redistributive effects are taken into account through the
political process, immigration and outsourcing may end up affecting the domestic economy
in completely different ways.
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4.2 Profit tax rate
We now obtain the profit tax rate reached under majority voting. Throughout the analysis
we keep the labor tax rate constant. Deriving (3.11) with respect to τ , we obtain
D(t, τ, ) =




= π + [t(1−)− τh]∂w
∂τ
+ (τπ − tw) ∂
∂τ
. (3.17)
Expression (3.16) implicitly defines τ(t, ; e) for e ∈ {M,W}. The second-order condition for
a maximum is Dτ < 0.
Our objective, as before, is to determine the impact of higher levels of outsourcing on τ ,
i.e., ∂τ/∂, for a given labor tax rate.
Numerical example
Table 3.3 shows the workers’ preferred profit tax rates for different values of , and Table 3.4
shows the corresponding values for managers. Throughout the exercise, the labor tax rate t
is kept constant at 0.15. The results are exactly the opposite as those obtained earlier, for
the case of labor tax rates. The political equilibrium profit tax rate increases as the amount
of outsourced labor rises for both ê ∈ W and ê ∈ W . However, τw > τm for all .
A higher level of increases the supply of managers and decreases the supply of workers.
Managers voting on the level of τ take this effect into account by choosing a higher level of τ ,
partially compensating for the process generated by the higher level of . The net outcome is,
however, a higher values of and w, but these are lower than they would have been otherwise.
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5 Conclusion
The present study focuses on the effect of outsourcing on labor and profit tax rates. The
main findings are that an increase in international outsourcing of low skill jobs leads to lower
labor taxes and higher profit taxes. If we combine these results with those of Eeckhout and
Jovanovic (2007), the implication of this study is that we should observe low labor taxes and
high profit taxes in the developed countries that have over time been increasingly sending
low skill jobs abroad to make use of cheap labor. Contrarily, the low income labor intensive
countries providing distant low skill services to the outsourcing firms should exhibit high
labor taxes and low profit taxes.
A future version of this model would drop the assumption of firms having identical
demand for labor expost. Firms would differ in their labor demand based on productivity
differences. While we expect the basic outcomes to remain unaffected, the latter version
does make way for a more realistic representation of the problem under consideration.
The model could be further extended to include low skill immigration and examine its
effects on these tax rates. Our hypothesis is that an increase in low skill immigration should
increase labor tax rates since now there would be a “leakage” in transfers since a part of it is
claimed by the immigrants. If that is true then the model should also be able to show that
contrary to popular belief immigration and outsourcing may not always act as substitutes.
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Table 3.1: Optimal labor tax rate for workers: different levels of outsourcing
tw w H N tww(1−) τπ T
0.90 0.0981 0.3967 0.6703 2.4209 0.6839 0.0397 0.0575 0.0972
0.95 0.0939 0.4216 0.6759 2.3222 0.6968 0.0367 0.0623 0.0990
1.00 0.0894 0.4489 0.6816 2.2275 0.7105 0.0336 0.0677 0.1012
1.05 0.0844 0.4790 0.6872 2.1375 0.7251 0.0302 0.0737 0.1039
Parameter values:
α = 0.80, γ = 0.20,= 0.20, τ = 0.175.
Table 3.2: Optimal labor tax rate for managers: different levels of outsourcing
tm w H N tmw(1−) τπ T
0.90 0.2957 0.5920 0.7292 1.5892 0.6320 0.0880 0.0794 0.1673
0.95 0.2873 0.6344 0.7351 1.5263 0.6508 0.0772 0.0876 0.1648
1.00 0.2783 0.6804 0.7407 1.4697 0.6706 0.0659 0.0968 0.1627
1.05 0.2690 0.7301 0.7458 1.4198 0.6912 0.0542 0.1070 0.1612
Parameter values:
α = 0.80, γ = 0.20,= 0.20, τ = 0.175.
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Table 3.3: Optimal profit tax rate for workers: different levels of outsourcing
τw w H N tw(1−) τwπ T
0.90 0.2170 0.3967 0.6703 2.4209 0.6491 0.0607 0.0714 0.1320
0.95 0.2199 0.4216 0.6759 2.3222 0.6589 0.0586 0.0783 0.1369
1.00 0.2230 0.4489 0.6816 2.2275 0.6691 0.0563 0.0862 0.1425
1.05 0.2263 0.4790 0.6872 2.1375 0.6800 0.0537 0.0953 0.1490
Parameter values:
α = 0.80, γ = 0.20,= 0.20, t = 0.15.
Table 3.4: Optimal profit tax rate for managers: different levels of outsourcing
τm w H N tw(1−) τmπ T
0.90 0.0363 0.5920 0.7292 1.5892 0.7382 0.0446 0.0164 0.0611
0.95 0.0471 0.6344 0.7351 1.5263 0.7517 0.0403 0.0236 0.0639
1.00 0.0580 0.6804 0.7407 1.4697 0.7657 0.0355 0.0321 0.0676
1.05 0.0691 0.7301 0.7458 1.4198 0.7800 0.0302 0.0423 0.0725
Parameter values:
α = 0.80, γ = 0.20,= 0.20, t = 0.15.
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Chapter 4
Immigration, Outsourcing and Tax
Policy: Evidence from OECD
Countries
1 Introduction
“Outsourcing and immigration remain an economic mirror image of each other”, a recent
article on Forbes said.1 As the global boundaries started to loosen over more than a decade
now, factor mobility also got redefined. This is especially true for economically developed
countries. Not only these countries attract cheap labor from the developing world, but they
also send out part or whole of their own jobs to the labor abundant low income countries.
Soon enough the cost saving strategies began to boomerang and strong feelings of insecurity
spread among the domestic labor force of the advanced part of the world. These two highly
controversial and influential products of globalization, namely immigration and outsourcing,
are much talked about in both economic and political spheres of the first world. The goal
of this paper is precisely to examine from a political economy point of view the effects
1The article written by Robert Malone appeared in Forbes.com, May 2007 <http:
//www.forbes.com/2007/05/21/outsourcing-world-atlas-biz-cx rm 0522atlas.html>
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of international migration and outsourcing on public finance concerns by focusing on the
resulting impact of these two alternatives on domestic labor taxes.
When a country’s market opens up to cheap foreign labor force, either by immigration
or by outsourcing, the domestic labor market is bound to get affected. Is their a difference
as far as their impact on the domestic labor market is concerned? We claim that different
levels of immigration and outsourcing affect domestic economic agents in conflicting ways.
Hence, under majority voting, we expect different equilibrium levels of domestic labor tax
rates chosen in each case.
The present study is built upon the integration of different issues; at least two of them
have been studied fairly widely.2. The first one concerns the relationship between domestic
government expenditures (or domestic taxation) and inflows of immigrants. A few papers
in this area have tried to identify the effect of immigration on domestic tax burden by
distinguishing immigrants of different skill levels. Most of this work concludes that low-
skilled immigrants would tend to increase fiscal burden, while high-skill immigrants would
have the opposite effect (see, for instance, Camarota (1998); Razin et al. (2002); Coleman
and Rowthorn (2004); and Borjas (1994)). Our work can be viewed as a contribution to this
literature. In particular, we are interested in determining how immigration affects the choice
of domestic tax rates when decisions are made following a political process.
The second issue refers to the connection between both immigration and outsourcing
and labor productivity. Some literature claims that immigration raises the productivity of
native workers; differences in workers’ types establish a complementary relationship between
domestic labor and immigrant labor.3 International outsourcing, through a different channel,
may also raise the real wage rate of domestic labor if the country outsources labor intensive
jobs and specializes itself in capital or skilled labor intensive production.4 For our paper,
2We will review this literature more carefully in 2
3See, for instance, Jones (2005). Along the same line of reasoning, Peri and Sparber (2006) suggest that
task specialization among low skilled immigrants and low skilled natives within the domestic economy may
help mitigate the negative impact of increased low skilled migration on domestic wages.
4Egger and Egger (2006) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), for example, find that international
outsourcing increases productivity of low skilled labor in the long run.
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these effects will be relevant to the extent that they affect voters’ choice of their preferred
domestic labor tax rate.
An additional issue, which has not received much attention in the literature to our knowl-
edge, concerns the differential impact of outsourcing and immigration on government expen-
ditures. As mentioned earlier, it is generally assumed that low-skill immigrants would tend
to receive an important proportion of government transfers resulting in an increase in tax
burden. Outsourcing, however, would not have such an impact. As a consequence, a lower
tax burden should be expected in economies that rely more heavily on outsourcing.
Our approach differs from the current literature on outsourcing and immigration in at
least two ways. First, we focus on both immigration and outsourcing at the same time.
Second, we consider the political determinants of domestic labor tax rates for different levels
of outsourcing and immigration. We adopt a similar line of reasoning as the one followed by
, but extending the analysis to include outsourcing as well.
The empirical analysis is based on the study of 15 OECD countries from 1990 to 2001,
typically referred to as the globalization period. The results show that immigration and
outsourcing may have quite contradictory effects on domestic labor tax rates, contrary to
popular belief that they are simply “mirror images”.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of recent
literature on the topics of immigration, outsourcing, and tax policy; section 3 describes the
data and the empirical approach; and section 4 presents the results of our analysis.
2 Conceptual Framework and Related Literature
In this section we provide an account of related literature that serves to develop our concep-
tual framework of analysis and to establish the grounds of the empirical analysis performed
in Section 3. Our claim is that outsourcing and immigration do not necessarily have the same
distributional effect on domestic agents. Thus, from a political economy point of view this
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differential impact would entail different voting outcomes and different tax/transfer policies.
For instance, low-skilled immigration is generally associated with higher taxes and more
government redistribution. Outsourcing, on the other hand, may even signify lower welfare
transfers. To the extent that these results hold, voting outcomes would be different in these
two cases. Additionally, part of the distributional impact takes place through the domestic
labor market; low- and high- skilled workers may be affected differently by outsourcing and
immigration. Our study focuses specifically on labor income tax rates and considers the
following question: assuming that tax rates are chosen by majority voting, does different
levels of outsourcing and immigration entail different voting outcomes?
As pointed out earlier, the present study can be viewed as an integration of three sep-
arate issues. The first one concerns the impact of immigration on domestic public finance.
The second issue refers to the relationship between outsourcing and immigration and labor
productivity. The third aspect of our work, the connection between outsourcing and labor
tax rates does not have, to our knowledge, any predecessor. We address next each of these
areas separately.
2.1 Immigration and Tax Policy
Fiscal effects of immigration have been examined vividly and conclusions from these studies
lack uniformity. The literature on this subject is vast; we name a few. Most of the research
in this field concludes that immigration of low skilled workers increases fiscal burden, since
low skilled immigrants are poor in general and, therefore, the benefits they receive from the
welfare state exceed their tax obligations. The consequence of immigration is, according to
this literature, an increase in tax burden on domestic labor. Dolmas and Huffman (2004)
provide a political economy analysis of immigration, government spending and taxation.
Their model predicts that a higher inequality in the distribution of capital will turn the
median voter against policies favoring immigration. In such a situation immigration will
induce the median voter to vote for higher tax rates; since high inequality is likely to place
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the median voter in the low income group.
However, Razin et al. (2002) show that this may not be necessarily true. They set
up a political-economy model that accounts for “two conflicting effects” of international
migration on tax and redistributive policies. Low skilled or low income immigrants join
the low income natives to vote for higher taxes and transfers. At the same time, “fiscal
leakages” (i.e., transfers going to low skilled immigrants) induce low skilled natives to join
the anti-tax coalition and vote for lower taxes. If the latter effect dominates, the net impact
of unskilled immigration on domestic labor tax is negative. That is, low skilled immigration
lowers tax rates on domestic labor. Their theory also predicts that medium and high skilled
immigration, on the contrary, has a positive impact on labor tax rate. Razin et al. (2002)
provide support to their theory with empirical evidence from 11 European countries. They
find that, after controlling for factors that play important roles in determining the size of
the welfare state, low skilled immigration lowers tax burden on domestic labor and high and
medium skilled immigration increases it. In our empirical model, we consider a variant of
Razin et al. (2002) focusing simultaneously on both outsourcing and immigration.
Borjas (2006) shows that income distribution moved largely in favor of the employers as
a result of immigration. He argues that immigration has little impact on fiscal issues like
payroll taxes, and that an increase in low-skill migration may actually raise these taxes to
some extent. He also acknowledges the fact that the skill composition of immigrants does
matter in the determination of income distribution. Low skilled immigration may reduce the
wages of the competing low skilled natives, but raise the wages of complementary high skilled
domestic workers. Influx of high skilled immigrants will have the opposite effect. Coleman
and Rowthorn (2004) analyze the economic effects of immigrants in the United Kingdom.
They argue that immigrant population can lower the tax burden on natives by sharing a part
of that burden. Camarota (1998) interprets the findings of the National Research Council
(NRC) regarding immigration trends in the United States and its implications for the fiscal
burden at various levels of the federal structure. He argues that at the state and local levels
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immigrants impose a considerable amount of extra tax burden, in other words, they receive
more public benefits relative to their tax contributions. At the federal level, on the other
hand, immigrants pay more taxes than value of transfers they receive. The net impact is,
however, an increase in fiscal burden. This paper also points out that the fiscal impact of
immigrants largely depends on their skill levels.5 Low skilled immigrants earn less income,
pay less taxes, and enjoy more transfers; the opposite is true for high skilled immigrants.
The empirical strategy that we follow in Section 3 aims at determining whether immigra-
tion and outsourcing behave as “substitutes” in the context of public finance. We examine
the extent to which different levels of immigration and outsourcing are in effect neutral in
terms of their impact on domestic tax policies. However, in light of the conclusions of the
work discussed above, it is necessary to account for the skill composition of immigrants in
order to approach this question correctly.
2.2 Immigration, Outsourcing, and Labor Productivity
The few studies that compare the effect of immigration and outsourcing on domestic labor
productivity reveal to some extent certain degree of substitutability between the two alterna-
tives in various respects. Jones (2005), for example, studies the impact of immigration and
international outsourcing on the domestic labor market. He argues that both immigration
of unskilled workers and outsourcing of labor intensive production processes may raise the
marginal productivity of local workers. Yomogida and Zhao (2005) examine the connection
between immigration and outsourcing with respect to their effects on labor markets for skilled
and unskilled workers and wage inequality. They conclude that unskilled immigration and
fragmentation of production processes have similar impact on the labor market, and skilled
immigration and outsourcing of services behave, under certain conditions, in the same way.
Bandyopadhyay and Wall (2006) present a general equilibrium model with immigration and
5In the 1950s and 1960s a few European countries implemented immigration policies which granted
temporary work permits to immigrants. However, these policies did not have the expected effect. In reference
to the failure of these policies, the Swiss writer Max Frisch has been claimed to say: ”We asked for workers.
We got human beings”
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outsourcing and show that if immigration quotas are relaxed, outsourcing declines, implying
that they would act as substitutes.
In this paper, however, we claim that in terms of their impact on domestic public finance
immigration of low skilled workers and outsourcing may, in fact, end up having completely
opposite effects, somewhat against conventional belief.
2.3 Outsourcing and Tax Policy
The controversy on outsourcing is mostly restricted to the possible impact of this phe-
nomenon on domestic labor markets. At large, the economic and political debate is focussed
on whether the outsourcing of jobs to low wage economies is endangering the job prospects
of domestic workers. There is no study until now, that we are aware of, examining the
fiscal effects of outsourcing. Some research do look at the impact of trade on tax policies.
For instance, Rodrik (1997) shows that trade increases tax burden on domestic labor. Han-
son et al. (2005) consider the role of immigration and trade in shaping people’s opinions
about globalization strategies. They claim that while immigration causes a “fiscal leakage”
in transfers, the problem does not exist when a country imports the goods that would have
been otherwise produced by the immigrants. They conclude that natives are likely to op-
pose immigration if it increases fiscal burden, but public finance concerns do not affect the
natives’ preference for a freer trade policy.
In our paper, we use Hanson et al. (2005)’s argument to justify why outsourcing should
have any fiscal impact whatsoever. Like trade, outsourcing poses no claim on domestic




In order to test whether immigration and outsourcing have differential impacts on domes-
tic taxes, we construct a regression model which extends Razin et al. (2002) by including
different measures of outsourcing. Specifically, the empirical strategy consists on regressing
domestic labor income tax rates on immigration, outsourcing, and other control variables.
We examine 15 OECD countries from 1990-2001. The choice of countries is mainly guided
by the fact that these countries have been the immigration hub and, at the same time, are
becoming increasingly dependent on international outsourcing.6 We also lag the explanatory
variables by one period in our analysis. This accounts for the lags with which fiscal policies
operate and also takes care of contemporaneous correlation issues.
The dependent variable in our regression model is effective labor tax rate which is mea-
sured following Mendoza et al. (1994). Figure 1 shows the behavior of this variable along
time and across countries.
Immigration is measured either as the share of foreign born or foreign population in
total population, depending on what the countries report. 7 Figure 2 shows the trend
of international migration as a share of total population. In general, this share has been
increasing over time, but the behavior across countries is not uniform. The United States
is, as expected, the highest recipient of international immigrants. We also adopt Razin
et al. (2002)’s methodology in constructing the data on immigrants on the basis of their
educational attainment, since data exists only for 1995.8
Absence of a unique indicator of outsourcing has resulted in the use of multiple measures
6We show later different indicators that confirm this last claim.
7Illegal immigration is also an issue in the present context. An increase in the number of illegal migrants
may affect domestic labor tax burden. However, we do not consider this case in our empirical study.
8Following Razin et al. (2002), the assumption that educational composition of migrants remain constant


















We use similar techniques to get data on low and medium education immigrants.
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in the existing literature; our model uses three of such measures. The first one, Outsourcing1,
is defined following Egger and Egger (2006) as the share of imported intermediate inputs in
the same 2 digit industry as in total output. The second measure, Outsourcing2 has been
constructed following Feenstra and Hanson (1999); it is the share of imported intermediate
inputs in total non-energy intermediates. Finally, Outsourcing3 a third indicator, also used
by Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), measures the share of imported intermediates in
total output.9 Figure 3 shows the trends in international outsourcing for the OECD countries
in our sample. All indicators increase for every country during the period under analysis
confirming an intense process of globalization.
We also control for other factors that possibly affect government expenditures and public
policies, and hence the effective labor tax rate. Below we provide a description of each of
these variables.
Income distribution and income inequality, in theory, are supposed to be crucial deter-
minants of government redistribution policies. They account for the fact that the median
voter plays a pivotal role in determining redistribution policies, so we should be looking at
the share of income accruing to the middle income group.10 Two standard indicators have
been used in the analysis. The first one is the rich/middle measure constructed by divid-
ing the uppermost decile by the middle. The second measure is the poor/middle measure
constructed by dividing the middle decile by the lowest.11
Other controls in the model include share of government employment in total employ-
ment, and dependency ratio, calculated by subtracting the share of labor force in total
population from one. The size of the government sector is likely to increase government
expenditures and make a case for higher taxes. The issue of dependency ratio and its fiscal
impact has been studied fairly widely, the conventional idea being that an increase in this
variable exerts additional fiscal pressure. Trade openness given by the share of imports and
9Please, see Appendix B for a detailed explanation about the construction of each measure.
10See Razin et al. (2002).
11The results are robust to the use of alternative income inequality measures, such as the Gini coefficient.
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exports in real GDP captures the effect of external shocks. Short run income fluctuations
are accounted for by including the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita. Finally, since
increase in unemployment rate puts toll on government transfers, it is also included as a
control in the model.12
Table 1 presents a summary of the data and correlations between the explanatory vari-
ables and the dependent variable, labor tax rate. The coefficients for immigration and all
three measures of outsourcing are of opposite signs. The correlation coefficients reveal the
conflicting effects of immigration and outsourcing on labor tax rate mentioned earlier. Also,
as shown in Table 2 all three measures of outsourcing are highly positively correlated, so
that they can be used as alternate indicators of the same phenomenon.13
4 Results
We estimate our model considering a pooled regression with country fixed effects, following
closely the strategy adopted by Razin et al. (2002). Table 3 shows the regression results.
The “baseline specification” includes one period lags of share of government employment
in total employment, dependency ratio, per capita GDP growth, trade openness, and two
indicators of income inequality.
Column (1) in Table 3 presents the outcome of the first regression, which does not include
immigration or outsourcing. The share of government employment is positively correlated
with labor tax rate, however, it is not statistically significant. Thus, even though an increase
in the government participation in the labor market is likely to increase tax burden, the
impact does not seem to be particulary strong. Dependency ratio has a negative coefficient,
12We are aware of the reverse type of causality under which higher taxes would imply higher levels of
unemployment. Daveri and Tabellini (2000), for instance, claim that if the labor market is not competi-
tive and workers have monopolistic power, the burden of labor tax is shifted to firms and that increases
unemployment. OLS regressions with unemployment rate as the dependent variable and share of migrants
in total population and outsourcing as the independent variables show that while migration has a positive
correlation with unemployment rate, it is not statistically significant. All outsourcing measures have nega-
tive correlations with unemployment rate and outsourcing 1 and 2 are statistically significant. We include
unemployment in our analysis to make it comparable to the results of Razin et al. (2002).
13See Appendix C for a description of the data sources.
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supporting Razin et al. (2002)’s hypothesis that a growing aging population germinates anti-
tax feelings among the working population and they vote for lower taxes. However it is not
statistically significant. level. Trade openness has a highly significant positive effect on
labor tax rate, consistent with the Rodrik (1997). Per capita GDP growth has a negative
and insignificant coefficient. The two income inequality indicators have somewhat conflicting
effects. Rich/Middle has a very significant negative coefficient, quite opposite to what we
would expect. A higher income inequality may put more people in lower tax brackets, thus
bringing down the burden of tax rate on labor. The second indicator poor/middle income
share is not significant at all.
Column (2) adds lag of share of immigrants in population to the model. The result
shows that international migration raises the labor tax rate, supporting popular belief. The
coefficient, however, is significant only at 16 percent level. An increase in the flow of inter-
national immigrants puts additional pressure on government transfers increasing the labor
tax rate. This is not unlikely, as claimed by Borjas (1994); 10 percent of households re-
ceiving public assistance in 1990 and 13 percent of total cash assistance recipients consisted
of foreign-born households in the United States. Camarota (1998) also points out that a
National Research Council (NRC) study reveals that the value of public assistance accruing
to immigrant households exceed their tax payments. Hence, there is a net increase on fiscal
burden. The result obtained in our empirical analysis, that immigration increases the tax
burden on domestic labor, may partly be explained by that finding.14
The next step of the analysis accounts for educational composition of immigrants. Ex-
isting literature acknowledges the fact that the impact of immigration on domestic labor
market as well as the burden imposed on the welfare state is to some extent shaped by the
skill composition of immigrants. Therefore, we decompose the total share of immigrants
into high, medium and low education as defined in the OECD database.15 In the regression,
14Note that the inclusion of the immigration variable does not alter the estimates of the other controls.
15The OECD database defines low education immigrants as those who have less than first stage of second
level schooling. Medium education immigrants include those who have completed second stage of second
level and immigrants who have completed third level belong to the high education category. High skilled
49
however, we simply include total immigrant share and high and medium education migrants
share clubbed together.16 Column (3) shows individual effects of high and low skilled migra-
tion. Classifying immigrants on the basis of their skill levels, in fact, makes immigration an
important determinant of labor tax rate. High and medium skilled migrants have a negative
correlation with labor income tax rate, whereas a higher share of low skilled immigrants (now
captured in the variable “Migrants/Population”) increases tax burden on domestic labor. 17
In terms of magnitude, low skilled immigration has a less impact than high skilled, although
the former is statistically more significant than the latter. This is also consistent with exist-
ing literature, though it fails to establish Razin et al. (2002) hypothesis that an increase in
low skilled immigration lowers domestic tax burden by inducing the low skilled workforce to
join the anti-tax coalition. It is interesting to observe that not only the direction of the effect
of low and high skilled immigrants is different, but they also differ in their magnitudes. The
estimates indicate that the increase in labor tax burden caused by low skilled immigrants
is largely more than compensated by the impact of high skilled immigrants. The disparity
with the Razin et al. (2002) model with respect to the effect of immigration on labor tax
burden can be attributed to the difference in time periods and selection of countries in the
two models. For instance, our dataset includes the United States, the highest recipient of
immigrants. Hence the negative impact of immigrants on the welfare state resulting in higher
taxes seems plausible. Other controls remain more or less unaltered.
Lagged unemployment rate is then added to the model; the estimated coefficients are
shown in column (4). The signs on the low skilled and high skilled migration variables
remain unchanged, however, now high skilled immigration has no significant impact of labor
immigrants in this model is the sum of high and medium education immigrants in total population.
16The reason we do not include both low skilled and high skilled measures together is due to the fact that
the OECD dataset on “Population and labor force by level of education”, also consists of a category whose
country of origin (national or foreign) is unknown and so is the level of education. Therefore taking into
account simply the measures of immigration by education level may yield misleading results. Razin et al.
(2002) also adopt the same strategy.
17This reflects Camarota’s (1998) argument that unlike low skilled migrants, high skilled immigrants earn
higher income and therefor pay higher taxes. However the high skilled migrants receive smaller transfers
and thus an increase in high skilled immigrants may lower tax burden on domestic labor.
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taxes, while low skilled is significant only at the 25 percent level.
At this stage we introduce “outsourcing” in the empirical model. Three alternative mea-
sures of outsourcing are used individually on the base model (excluding migration and unem-
ployment rate). It is worth noting that all outsourcing indicators essentially reflect low skilled
jobs, since they include only manufacturing industries. Columns (5), (6) and (7), respec-
tively, show the effects of different indicators of outsourcing (Outsourcing1, Outsourcing2,
and Outsourcing3) on labor tax rates. All measures seem to have a negative and significant
impact on the dependent variable. The coefficients show that for the first measure, a unit
increase in outsourcing will lower tax burden by 0.03. The second measure has a compara-
tively smaller impact, while the effect of outsourcing captured by the third indicator seems
to be quite substantial. The coefficient of Outsourcing3 indicates that a unit increase in
outsourcing lowers tax rate by approximately 0.69 units. These results are consistent with
the hypotheses that outsourcing, especially of low skill activities, enhances productivity of
domestic labor force. Work in this area finds that in the long-run, an increase in interna-
tional outsourcing increases the productivity of low skilled workers for the US manufacturing
industries (see Feenstra and Hanson (1999)) and in EU manufacturing industries (see Eg-
ger and Egger (2006)). Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) also show that international
off-shoring is equivalent to technological advancement and as a result enhances the produc-
tivity of the factor whose job is being outsourced. Our results may be reflecting this fact.
If domestic low skilled workforce becomes more productive and income distribution moves
in favor of them, they move up the tax bracket and are likely to join the high-skilled in
the anti-tax coalition. Therefore international outsourcing of low skilled jobs should lower
domestic tax burden. The results remain unaltered with the addition of unemployment. In
fact Outsourcing1 and Outsourcing2 become even more significant. These results are not
reported.
Finally, the model includes low and high skilled immigrants and outsourcing. Column
(8) reveals that, contrary to popular belief, low skilled immigration and outsourcing have
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opposite effects on labor tax rate. Low skilled immigration increases tax burden on domestic
labor, while low skilled outsourcing lowers the burden.18 Also both immigration and out-
sourcing are significant. In terms of the magnitude of their impacts, low skilled immigration
has a more important effect than outsourcing. This is expected since the fiscal impact of
foreign labor force located outside the country is more subtle. Column (8) also shows that
the estimated coefficients of high skilled immigration and outsourcing are essentially the
same as the estimates obtained when each variable is introduced at a time. No significant
changes are observed in the estimated coefficients of other control variables.
The subsequent columns (9) and (10) use alternative measures of outsourcing. Again
most of the basic results remain unchanged. Low skilled migration and Outsourcing2 are
significant at the 5 percent and high skilled migration is significant at the 10 percent level.
Outsourcing3 also has a negative coefficient, and significant only at the 5 percent level.
High skilled migration, however, is now significant at the 12 percent level, while low skilled
migration continues to be significant at the 5 percent level. All these cases reveal that
low skilled outsourcing and low skilled immigration have significantly opposite impact on
effective labor tax rate.
Columns (11),(12) and (13) reestimates the model using skill compositions of immigrants
and alternative measures of outsourcing in the presence of unemployment rate. Outsourcing1
and Outsourcing2 become even more significant, while Outsourcing3 is now significant at
the 10 percent level. High skilled migration still bears a negative relationship with labor tax
rate, however, it is not statistically significant anymore. Low skilled migration also maintains
its positive sign although it is now significant at about 27 percent level on average. The
results support our claim that low skilled immigration and outsourcing have very different
implications regarding labor tax rates.
To summarize, our empirical results show that low skilled immigration and outsourcing
18Regressions including only the share of immigrants and not considering educational classification, also
show that immigration has a positive, while outsourcing has a negative impact on labor tax rate. Only
migration share is significant at the 20 percent level on average. We do not report these results.
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of low-skilled related activities, tend to have opposite effects on the domestic labor tax rate.
An increase in the number of low skilled migrants increases the tax rate, while an increase in
outsourcing of low skilled jobs lowers it. Thus, our results support the idea that immigration
of low-skilled workers would tend to increase the fiscal burden. Outsourcing of low skilled
jobs, however, may result on lower domestic tax rates since outsourcing does not make any
claims on government transfers. 19 Furthermore, our findings are consistent with the research
that shows that outsourcing enhances productivity of low skilled labor. The idea is that as
wages of low-skilled go up with outsourcing, they may choose to join the anti-tax coalition
with the high-income group.
5 Conclusion
International migration and outsourcing are currently issues of major policy concerns. Ex-
isting research rarely brings these two alternatives together, mostly due to the general idea
that they are both sides of the same coin. Few studies look jointly at immigration and out-
sourcing from a theory of production and labor market perspective. The common element
of these theories is the treatment of immigration and outsourcing as “substitutes”.
Our results show that the fact that immigration and outsourcing are “mirror images”
cannot be generalized; if we look at the two from a public finance viewpoint we find that
they both significantly affect domestic tax burden but in very different and rather opposite
ways; while low-skilled immigration raises the domestic labor income tax rate, outsourcing
tends to reduce it.
The findings of this study further reinforce some earlier work on the effect of outsourcing
on domestic workers. It has been claimed in earlier literature that outsourcing increases
productivity (and, hence, real wages) of domestic low-skilled workers. From a political
19We also construct a measure of per capita transfers using OECD National Accounts data on social expen-
ditures. We then estimate OLS regressions with per capita transfers as the dependent variable and migration
share and outsourcing as independent variables. Neither immigration or outsourcing have significant impact
on welfare expenditures. In particular, immigration has a negative coefficient while outsourcing is found to
have an ambiguous relation with per capita transfers depending on which outsourcing indiactor we use.
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economy perspective, it can be argued that this group of workers will then have incentives
to join the high-income group and vote for lower domestic labor tax rates. Along this same
line of reasoning, and light of our results, low skilled immigration should not have the same
impact as foreign outsourcing on labor productivity.
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The purpose of this research is to provide new insights in an important aspect of globalization,
namely international mobility of capital and labor. The effectiveness of public policies, both
in terms of direction and intensity varies according to the flexibility with which factors of
production can leave and enter a country.
The essays in this dissertation consecutively provide evidence on the immense growth in
capital mobility and analyze the impact of increased labor mobility on domestic tax rates
both empirically and theoretically.
The main conclusions of the dissertation are first, there has been phenomenal growth in
the international mobility of capital in the last thirty years, and the noticeable part of this
growth is observed during the nineties, typically referred to as the globalization period. Two
alternative approaches, namely employing the saving-investment correlation coefficient and
the balance of trade and investment correlation coefficient equally support the hypothesis of
increasing capital mobility. Thus the Feldstein-Horioka puzzle revealing capital immobility
in OECD countries disappears and what emerges from this research is the pattern in which
the increase in capital mobility has taken place.
The future course of this finding is directed towards identifying the sources that led to
the sudden growth in capital mobility during the nineties. The role of government policies
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as well as institutional factors need to be evaluated in this context.
Secondly, labor mobility, which no longer is restricted to the concept of immigration, but
extends further to include outsourcing has profound implications for domestic fiscal policies.
The main findings are that an increase in international outsourcing of low skill jobs leads
to lower labor taxes and higher profit taxes. The deeper implications of the theoretical model
is that we should observe low labor taxes and high profit taxes in the developed countries
that have over time been increasingly sending low skill jobs abroad to make use of cheap
labor. Contrarily, the low income labor intensive countries providing distant low skill services
to the outsourcing firms should exhibit high labor taxes and low profit taxes.
Finally an empirical application of the model presenting an analysis of a set of OECD
countries imply that an increase in low skill immigration increases domestic labor tax rate
whereas an increase in low skill outsourcing reduces it.
The results imply that the fact that immigration and outsourcing are “mirror images”
cannot be generalized; if we look at the two from a public finance perspective they both
significantly affect domestic tax burden but in very different and rather opposite ways.
The findings of this study further reinforce some earlier work on the effect of outsourcing
on domestic workers. It has been claimed in earlier literature that outsourcing increases
productivity (and, hence, real wages) of domestic low-skill workers. From a political economy
perspective, it can be argued that this group of workers will then have incentives to join the
high-income group and vote for lower domestic labor tax rates. Along this same line of
reasoning, and light of our results, low skilled immigration should not have the same impact
as foreign outsourcing on labor productivity.
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Appendix A
Description of Data - Capital Mobility
This paper follows Feldstein and Horioka and restricts the study to OECD countries for the
main conclusion. However, the dataset is larger since it includes the whole set of OECD
countries, making a total of 29 countries (excluding Luxembourg).1 The sample period
spreads over 34 years starting in 1970, ending at 2003. The regressions for developing
countries uses data on saving, investment and GDP for 61 developing countries.
Data on Gross Domestic Investment (as share of GDP), Gross Domestic Savings (as a
share of GDP), Current account balance (as a share of GDP) and GDP for both OECD and
developing countries is obtained from World Development Indicators 2005. The variables
that we use in our regressions are defined as follows:2
GDI = Share of gross domestic investment in GDP. Gross domestic investment consists
of outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level
of inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements (fences, ditches, drains, and
so on); plant, machinery, and equipment purchases; and the construction of roads,
railways, and the like, including schools, offices, hospitals, private residential dwellings,
and commercial and industrial buildings. Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms
to meet temporary or unexpected fluctuations in production or sales, and ”work in
progress.” According to the 1993 SNA, net acquisitions of valuables are also considered
capital formation.
GDS = Share of gross domestic savings in GDP. Gross domestic savings are calculated
as GDP less final consumption expenditure (total consumption).
CA = Current account balance is the sum of net exports of goods, services, net income,
and net current transfers.
GDP = GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation
of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are
1The data set considered in the literature usually excludes Luxembourg since it is considered to be an
outlier.
2Definitions are quoted from the 2005 World Development Indicators data.
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in constant 2000 U.S. dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic
currencies using 2000 official exchange rates.
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Appendix B
Detailed description of “Labor tax
rate” and “Outsourcing” measures
B.1. Labor tax rate = Effective tax rate on labor, τl
Reproducing from Mendoza et al. (1994):
τl =
(





τh = 1100/(OSPUE + PEI +W ),
1100 = Taxes on income, profits, and capital gains of individuals;
2000 = Total social security contributions;
2200 = Employer’s contribution to social security;
3000 = Taxes on payroll and workforce;
W = Wages and salaries;
OSPUE = Operating surplus of private unincorporated enterprises;
PEI = Household’s property and entrepreneurial enterprises.
B.2. Outsourcingi = Outsourcing measured in three different ways,
i = 1, 2, 3
All three indicators use import of intermediate inputs, calculated following Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2006). The assumption crucial to the calculation is that the ratio of imports
to domestic output of a particular industry replicates the ratio of imported intermediates to
domestic intermediates. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) use this same assumption.
Imports of intermediate goods in the whole economy is thus calculated as a weighted
sum of total intermediate goods used in each manufacturing industry, the weights being the
share of imports in total output (given by sum of domestic production and imports). Also,






where, for industry i,
η = Total intermediate inputs;
ηM = Imported intermediate inputs;
qM = Total imports;
qD = Total domestic production;
Once we obtain ηMi , we can construct the three different measures of outsourcing used
in the empirical analysis of our paper as follows.
B.3. Outsourcing1
This measure is constructed following Egger and Egger (2006). It is defined as the share of
intermediate imports in the same 2-digit industries in total production. For every country







Dic = Diagonal term of 2-digit input output matrix divided by total intermediates used by
industry i; Dic is assumed to be constant; our paper uses 1995 data for Dic; and
Yitc = Total production.
B.4. Outsourcing2
The second indicator of outsourcing is defined as the share of imported intermediate inputs
in total non-energy intermediates. This is also termed the “broad” measure of outsourcing
in Feenstra and Hanson (1999). Again, input output tables for non-energy intermediates are
available only for 1995 and 2000.
To construct Outsourcing2 first the ratio of non-energy intermediates to total inter-
mediates in 1995 is calculated. This is a fixed number which is then multiplied by total
intermediate inputs for all years to get the total non-energy intermediates usage by each











i,1995,c × total intermediates
where,










The third indicator of outsourcing shows the share of imported intermediate inputs in total












1Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) also construct another measure of outsourcing, namely the share
of imported intermediate inputs in total intermediates. Our analysis does not include this measure since the
Feenstra-Hanson measure already takes into account non-energy intermediates. We stick to this measure




The study uses data from multiple sources. Effective labor tax rate is constructed with data
from National Accounts Volume II and Revenue Statistics published by the OECD. Part of
the dataset also draws from Takashima (2007).
The main explanatory variables are share of immigrants in total population and interna-
tional outsourcing. International Migration Statistics (OECD), provide data on migration
and educational classification of migrants for all OECD countries except Norway. The data
for Norway is taken from Norway Stat.
Industrial data on total output, total imports and imported and domestic intermediate
goods required to measure international outsourcing are taken from the STAN Industrial
database and input-output tables published by OECD.
Income inequality measures are constructed using data on income distribution by deciles
from the World Inequality Database. The regressions use only high quality data. 1 Other
control variables such as unemployment rate, per capita GDP growth rate, employment,
and population are taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS). Share of government
employment in total employment is also calculated with data from National Accounts Volume
II published by the OECD. The Penn World Tables provide data on trade openness.
1The World Income Inequality Database provides a classification of data on the basis of their quality
rating. High quality data refers to the dataset with quality rating “1”, which means that this dataset is
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